Security Analysis and Design for TAGA: a Touch and Go Assistant in the
  Aerospace Domain by Fröschle, Sibylle et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
02
51
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  6
 A
pr
 20
20
Security and Resilience for TAGA: a Touch and Go
Assistant in the Aerospace Domain
Sibylle Fro¨schle∗, Martin Kubisch‡, Marlon Gra¨fing¶
∗OFFIS Institute of Informatics & University of Oldenburg, Oldenburg, Germany, Email: sibylle.froeschle@offis.de
‡Airbus, Munich, Germany, Email: martin.kubisch@airbus.com
∗OFFIS Institute of Informatics, Oldenburg, Germany, Email: marlon.graefing@offis.de
Abstract—There is currently a drive in the aerospace domain
to introduce machine to machine communication over wireless
networks to improve ground processes at airports such as
refuelling and air conditiong. To this end a session key has to
be established between the aircraft and the respective ground
unit such as a fuel truck or a pre-conditiong unit. This is to be
provided by a ‘touch and go assistant in the aerospace domain’
(TAGA), which allows an operator to pair up a ground unit
and an aircraft present at a parking slot with the help of a
NFC system. In this paper, we present the results of our security
analysis and co-development of requirements, security concepts,
and modular verification thereof. We show that by, and only by,
a combination of advanced security protocols and local process
measures we obtain secure and resilient designs for TAGA. In
particular, the design of choice is fully resilient against long-term
key compromises and parallel escalation of attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine to machine (M2M) communication over wireless
networks is increasingly adopted to improve speed, efficiency
and accuracy of service and maintenance processes at airports,
ports, and manufacturing plants. This does not come without
security challenges: often these processes are safety-critical,
and often, multi-instance attacks against them would disrupt
critical infrastructures. One example are the ground processes
at an airport. When an airplane has landed and reached its
parking slot at the apron many processes such as refuelling
and air conditioning are performed. These processes determine
the turnaround time, i.e. the time an airplane needs to remain
parked at the apron. Most ground operations that require a
control loop are currently based on human-to-human commu-
nication, i.e. an operator at the ground machine and another in
the aircraft. M2M communication between the ground unit and
the aircraft will simplify such ground operations. Moreover,
the use of wireless connections is a must-have due to the harsh
conditions of the apron and increased flexibility.
Hence, there is ongoing activity on how to integrate secure
M2M communication between ground units and an aircraft
during turnaround. It is planned to use IEEE 802.11 WLAN
as wireless channel, and to secure the data exchanged by AES-
CCMP analogously to WPA2. However, the challenge remains
of how to set up a session key securely in this setting where
one party is mobile, the other is at different locations, and
there is no notion of global trust.
A use case within the project XXX is currently underway
that advocates a touch and go assistant in the aerospace
domain (TAGA) to solve this challenge. The idea behind TAGA
is that a key can be established by pairing a ground unit
and an aircraft both present at the same parking slot based
on their proximity — a bit similar to pairing a bluetooth
device to a vehicle infotainment system but over a greater
distance and truly secure. To this end, each aircraft and ground
unit is to be equipped with a TAGA controller that contains
a secure element for cryptographic operations and an NFC
reader (accessible from an outside control panel). Moreover,
the operator of each ground unit is to be provided with a
passive NFC card. Altogether, this allows them to transport
messages for key establishment from the ground unit, to the
aircraft, and back by means of taps with the NFC card against
the respective NFC reader. The ‘TAGA walk’ can conveniently
be integrated into the operator’s usual path to the aircraft and
back while connecting up the respective supply hose.
The advantage of such local key establishment is that there
is no need to exchange the identities of the airplane and ground
units beforehand, and that there is no need for a central trusted
party that provides for key management. Thereby the flexibility
and trust assumptions of the current paper- and human-based
ground processes can be maintained. However, in contrast to
local pairing of infotainment devices, TAGA is safety-critical
and the design must be amenable to formal verification to meet
current safety and security norms in the aerospace domain.
Our Contribution: We have conducted a security anal-
ysis and co-developed security and resilience requirements,
security concepts, and a modular verification pattern of how
to establish that the requirements are met by a security
concept. We have also provided informal proofs of all our
results. To our knowledge this is the first systematic analysis,
design space exploration, and verification method for local key
establishment. We hope the results can also serve as a blueprint
for other settings of M2M communication. In more detail, our
contributions are:
(1) We concisely define the TAGA use case, and show how
it can be integrated into current processes for air conditioning
and fuelling. We make precise which overall guarantee the
setup of a ground service with M2M communication must
meet. We also provide an interface to safety analysis by
identifying five categories of attacks, what potential safety
impact they can cause, and which preconditions concerning
key establishment the attacker has to reach to mount them.
Throughout it becomes clear: While, as usual, it is crucial
that the established key remains secret from the attacker a
new challenge critical to key establishment for M2M commu-
nication is that the key is indeed shared between the parties
that are (or will be) physically connected.
(2) We explore whether we can obtain secure plain TAGA,
where the underlying key establishment (KE) protocol is
unauthenticated, and hence, does not require any PKI. It is
well-known that such protocols cannot be secure against active
adversaries but that, like the Diffie-Hellman key exchange,
they can guarantee security in the presence of passive adver-
saries. Hence, the challenge lies in whether we can implement
the TAGA transport in a way so that it provides an authentic
message exchange. We show that this is indeed possible but it
comes at a cost, which involves key management local to the
airport, distance bounding the communications of the readers,
and a high dependence on ground staff. On the positive side,
our designs for plain TAGA come with the advantage that they
ensure resilience against parallel escalation of attacks.
(3) We investigate authenticated TAGA (a-TAGA), which
is based on an authenticated KE (AKE) protocol and PKIs
governed locally by airports, and airlines respectively. It is
well-known that AKE protocols can securely establish a key
in the presence of active adversaries. We show that it is
straightforward to implement secure a-TAGA when we relax
the definition of security in a way that only guarantees
location agreement rather than alignment with the operator’s
TAGA walk. The new definition still enables the correct setup
of ground processes. However, we are faced with another
challenge now: Our setting requires that a-TAGA must be
highly resilient against long-term key compromises (LTKC).
We identify three notions of LTKC resilience and show how
each can be met by a combination of advanced properties of
AKE protocols and local process measures.
Altogher, we obtain several designs that are secure and
resilient. The design of choice combines a-TAGA with an
authentic local channel, and is fully resilient against LTKCs
and parallel escalation of attacks. The remainder of the paper
is structured according to the three parts. Related work can be
found in App. A, and the notation we use for KE protocols is
explained in App. B. The proofs are provided in the remainder
of the appendix.
II. GROUND SERVICES WITH M2M COMMUNICATION
A. The TAGA Use Case
1) Actors and Setting: TAGA pairing takes place when an
aircraft (AC) A has its turnaround at an airport H. Then
A is parked at a parking slot L of H, and a secure zone
is established around A, to which only authorized personnel
have access. When a ground unit (GU) is to provide a ground
service S to A then the operator Op of G carries out TAGA
pairing as part of setting up the GU for the service. To this
end, each AC and GU is equipped with a NFC reader, and
the operator holds a passive NFC card. By means of NFC
taps with the card the operator can transfer messages for key
establishment from the GU to the AC and back. Once TAGA
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Fig. 2. TAGA pairing with Diffie-Hellman key exchange
pairing is successfully concluded A and G share a session key
for secure M2M communication on service S over WLAN.
One AC can perform the TAGA process with several GUs in
parallel, and one service might require several GUs. However,
each card, operator, and GU are involved in at most one TAGA
process at a time. Each AC is owned by an airline A, and each
GU is governed by an airport H. It is usual that an airport H
does not operate the ground services itself, but has entrusted
an airport service provider P with the handling thereof. Each
AC and GU is equipped with a controller that computes the
TAGA functionality. The controller is equipped with the NFC
reader and a secure element, which supports secure key storage
and cryptographic operations for key management.
2) TAGA Pairing Process: TAGA pairing is based on a
three-pass key establishment (KE) protocol, where the third
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pass is a key confirmation step. It is illustrated in Fig. 2 for
the case when the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange is used
as the underlying protocol. Let A be the AC, G be the GU,
and Op be the operator of G.
First message pass. Op initiates TAGA by an initial NFC
tap with her NFC card C at G’s controller. Thereby the first
message M1 is written to the card. M1 contains information
necessary for establishing the key together with the ID of G
and the service S that G wishes to provide. Op carries M1
stored on C to the AC. There she carries out a mid NFC tap,
during which message M1 is transferred to A’s controller.
Second message pass. The AC checks whether the con-
nection should be granted. In the positive case, A generates
message M2, which is written onto the NFC card, also during
the mid NFC tap. M2 contains information necessary for
establishing the key together with the ID of A and access data
to A’s WLAN such as the SSID. It also contains a ciphertext
to grant key confirmation to G. The operator then carries the
card with M2 back to G. There she transfers M2 from the
card to G’s controller by a final NFC tap.
WLAN and third message pass. G is now able to connect
to A’s WLAN. A third message is passed over the WLAN
connection to achieve key confirmation to A.
3) Ground Services with TAGA: We explain the process
flow for air conditioning with secure M2M communication,
and TAGA pairing integrated into the setup phase. Examples
for fuelling with one and two trucks are provided in App. C.
The process flow for air conditioning is shown in Fig. 3.
During the setup phase TAGA pairing is naturally integrated
into the path that the operator needs to trace for the physical
setup. First, the operator performs the first NFC tap at the
pre-conditioning unit, and then walks to the AC carrying the
air supply hose. After he has connected the hose to the AC’s
supply port the operator performs the second NFC tap at the
AC, and then walks back to the pre-conditioning unit. There
he performs the third NFC tap, and switches on the air supply.
The pre-conditioning unit and AC are now ready to carry
out the actual air conditioning during the M2M phase. First,
the unit sends a request to receive data from the AC. This
e.g. includes the desired temperature, the airflow parameters
suitable for the AC, and readings of temperature sensors. The
physical process is then controlled by the pre-conditioning unit
based on temperature readings continuously communicated
from the AC. When the desired temperature is reached the unit
notifies the AC, and the service enters the disconnect phase.
During this final phase the communication session is closed,
and the operator disconnects the supply hose.
B. Correct Setup of Ground Services
The setup of a ground service must guarantee that the
AC and each of the participating GUs are both physically
connected as well as linked by a secure cyber channel. We now
make precise this guarantee, based on definitions of secure
channel and process flow for a ground service.
1) Cyber Connection and Secure Channel: A (cyber) con-
nection owned by a GU or AC for (M2M communication on)
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Fig. 3. Process flow for air conditioning
service S is defined by a tuple (cid ,DP ,K, S) where cid is
the identifier of the connection, DP is a data confidentiality
and integrity protocol (such as AES-CCMP), and K is a
session key (such as established by TAGA). Hence, two parties
that own matching connections can exchange data on S over
the connection cid transformed by DP using K as the key.
We say a GU G and an AC A share a secure channel for
(M2M communication on) service S if G and A both own a
connection (cid ,DP ,K, S) such that (1) DP is secure, and
(2) K is freshly generated and only known to G and A. When
DP and cid are clear from the context we also write (K,S)
for a secure channel.
2) Process Flow for a Ground Service: A process flow F
for a ground service S (with M2M communication) is a tuple
(nF , AF , <F , PF ), where nF specifies the number of required
GUs, (AF , <F ) is a partial order of actions to be carried out
by the participating actors (GUs, AC, operators, perhaps crew),
and PF is a multiset of parking positions relative to the AC
such that PF is of size nF . PF specifies where the n GUs are
parked during the process (e.g. [right wing, left wing] or [mid,
mid]). We require PF to be a multiset rather than a set since
a service can involve several GUs at one relative position, and
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in practice it is important to avoid unnecessary precision (such
as defining sub-positions). Given GUs G1, . . . , Gn such that
each Gi is located at the same parking slot, we denote the
multiset of their relative positions by pos({G1, . . . , Gn}).
We assume the actions of each participant are divided into a
setup phase, a M2M phase, during which the actual service is
carried out, and a disconnect phase. We require that (AF , <F )
guarantees: (1) A ground coordinator ensures that exactly nF
GUs for service S, say G1, . . . , Gn, are at the parking slot
such that pos({G1, . . . , Gn}) = PF . (2) When, in the view
of an operator Op, the setup phase is completed then the GU
Op operates is physically connected up for service S to A.
(3) When, in the view of a GU G, the setup phase is completed
then G has a cyber connection for service S. (4) When, in the
view of an AC A, the setup phase is completed then A has
exactly nF cyber connections for service S.
3) Correct Setup of Ground Service: Let L be a parking
slot, on which a turnaround process takes place. We denote
the one AC that is present at L by AC (L). Let F be a process
flow for service S. We say F guarantees Correctness of Setup
to a GU G if, whenever G engages into the M2M phase of F
at a parking slot L then
1) pos({G}) ∈ PF and G is physically connected for
service S to AC (L), and
2) G shares a secure channel for service S with AC (L).
We say F guarantees Correctness of Setup to an AC A
if, whenever A engages into the M2M phase of F at a
parking slot L then there are nF GUs G1, . . . , Gn at L with
pos({G1, . . . , Gn}) = PF such that
1) A is physically connected for service S to and only to
the GUs G1, . . . , Gn, and
2) A shares a secure channel for service S with and only
with each of the GUs G1, . . . , Gn.
We say F guarantees Correctness of Setup if it guarantees this
to both, GUs and ACs.
C. M2M Attack Categories and Safety Impact
Let L be a parking position, A be the AC at L, and GS a GU
to provide service S at L. Assume the attacker intends to cause
harm at L by undermining the M2M communication between
A and GS . There are five categories of attacks the attacker
can aim for. Each category comes with different preconditions
he needs to achieve first. We say the attacker has reached a
state from which he can mount a . . .
1) Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack ifGS has a connection
(K,S) and A has a connection (K ′, S) but the attacker
knows both K and K ′.
2) Impersonation to GU (Imp2GU) attack if GS has a
connection (K,S) but the attacker knows K .
3) Impersonation to AC (Imp2AC) attack if A has a con-
nection (K,S) but the attacker knows K .
4) Mismatch of GU attack if GS has a connection (K,S),
and some A′ at parking slot L′ has a connection (K,S′)
but L 6= L′ or S 6= S′ while the attacker does not know
K . In the first case we speak of a location mismatch,
in the second of a service mismatch. There can also be
location and service mismatch attacks.
5) Mismatch of AC attack is analogously defined.
The attack categories are illustrated in Fig. 4. We now
discuss their potential safety impact by means of our examples
air conditioning and fuelling.
a) Man-in-the-Middle (MitM): The most serious attack
is a MitM: it means the attacker can insert, delete or modify
any messages as he pleases. As our examples show the safety
impact is high for air conditioning but not so for fuelling due
to inbuilt safety measures.
Example 1 (Air Conditioning). The attacker can forge airflow
parameters and sensor values that will induce GS to apply air
pressure and temperature unsuitable to A. This can be highly
damaging: if the cooling process is too fast, water in the pipes
can quickly become frozen and clog up the pipes. This can
happen very quickly: e.g. with the lowest inlet temperature
within 30 seconds, with safety considerations still within 100
seconds. The resulting backflow will be detected by the GU.
However, in the worst case pipes might already have burst. In
any case the pipes have to be checked for damage afterwards,
which is a costly procedure. In the worst case, the attacker
could try to optimize the attack based on the sensor values
sent by A: he could try to control the airflow in a way that
maximizes the strain on the pipes without this being detected
during service time but with a high risk that pipes burst during
flight.
Example 2 (Fuelling). The attacker can forge fuel orders, and
induce the fuel truck to load an insufficient or surplus amount
of fuel. While this can be highly disruptive there is no safety
impact. Since the AC measures the fuel itself A will notice if
the loaded fuel is not sufficient. Moreover, if the attacker tries
to cause spillage (and hence a fire hazard) by too large a fuel
order this will not succeed either since backflow will stop the
pump of the fuel truck.
b) Impersonation to GU (Imp2GU): Another serious
attack state is that for (pure) Imp2GU. This allows the attacker
to feed any information he likes to GS while GS thinks this
information stems from A and adjusts the service correspond-
ingly. The safety impact is potentially high.
Example 3 (Air Conditioning). The attacker feeds in airflow
parameters and sensor values, and GS will control the airflow
based on this information. Since the air supply leads directly
into the mixer unit of the plane this will take immediate effect
without A itself having to open a valve or the like first. Crew
or ground stuff might notice that something is wrong and
switch off the air supply manually. However, as discussed in
Example 1 damage can occur quickly and this might be too
late. In contrast to the MitM attack the attacker is not able to
optimize the attack based on sensor values from A.
c) Impersonation to AC (Imp2AC): When the physical
control of the service lies entirely with the GU then an
Imp2AC attack is usually harmless. However, this might
change when several GUs are employed.
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Example 4 (Fuelling with two trucks). Assume fuelling with
two trucks is carried out. Assume the truck under the left wing
is already connected (both physically and in cyber) while the
truck under the right wing is still being set up and the fueller
currently opens the tank. Now assume that by an Imp2AC
attack the attacker pretends the right truck is also fully set up.
Then (in the case of automatic control) the AC will open the
fuel valves, order fuel, and the left truck will start pumping
fuel. However, the right operator is at the open tank, and a
highly unsafe situation has been reached.
d) Imp2GU with Mismatch Diversion: When an attacker
mounts a Imp2GU attack it might be beneficial for him to
divert the AC by matching it up with another GU. One
reason is to thereby ensure that the impersonation attack
remains undetected for longer; another reason is that without a
successful session the AC might not be affected at all, perhaps
because it controls a valve that it will not open otherwise.
Example 5 (Fuelling). When fuelling the pilot has to open the
valves of the tanks before the fuel flow can start. Hence, as
long as A does not have a successful session for fuelling the
Imp2GU attack will be detected early on: the fuel pump of
GS will stop almost immediately due to backflow. However,
if the attacker conducts a ‘location mismatch of AC attack’ in
parallel then A will open the fuel valves, and the attacker can
make GS load fuel based on a forged order. Fortunately, in
this case there is no safety impact as explained in Example 2.
e) Location Mismatch of GU: We have just seen that
mismatch attacks can be used as a diversion. The next example
illustrates that they can be safety-critical in their own right.
Example 6 (Air Conditioning). Let A′ be an AC at another
parking position L′ with ongoing air conditioning service.
Assume A′ is a large plane (e.g. an A380), and A is a
smaller plane (e.g. an A319). Moreover, assume the attacker
has obtained the state for location mismatch of GS where GS
is speaking to A′. Hence, A′ will communicate its parameters
for airflow to GS while GS’s air supply hose is connected to
the smaller A. Since the airpacks of A are smaller than those
of A′ airflow parameters suitable for A′ can be damaging for
A: the air pressure is likely to be too high and the cooling
process too fast. As a consequence pipes of A can be damaged
as explained in Example 1.
f) and g) Service Mismatch: A service mismatch will
likely be noticed as soon as M2M communication starts. The
messages will not follow the protocol the AC, and respectively
GU expects, and hence errors will be raised: e.g. the AC
provides temperature readings while the GU expects a fuel
order. However, a service mismatch could still be employed
as a diversion to support another attack: when the only goal
is that the party to divert has established a channel for the
service (because only then it will open a valve), or when the
service is such that there usually is a delay between the point
when the channel is established and the start of the M2M
communication.
III. PLAIN TAGA
1) Preliminaries:
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NFC System, Sessions, and Taps: An NFC system (for
TAGA) is a triple N = (RGU , C,RAC ), where RGU is the
reader at the GU, C is the NFC card, and RAC is the reader at
the AC. We assume readers are equipped with a status display.
An NFC data exchange session (NFC ssn) is an event δ of
a reader or card D, during which D establishes an NFC link
with another party, say D′, exchanges data with D′ (in the
view of D), and then closes the link. If D encounters an error
during any of these steps then δ is unsuccessful otherwise it
is successful. In the latter case, we denote D′ by partner(δ),
and the trace of received and sent messages by msg(δ). Often
the data exchange will consist of a pair of messages mr and
ms such that mr is received by D and ms is sent by D. Then
we denote mr by msg-r(δ) and ms by msg-s(δ). If D is a
reader it will signal on its display whether an NFC ssn has
been completed successfully or not (e.g. green or red light).
An NFC tap is an event τ of an actor O, during which O
brings a card C close to a reader R and verifies whether R
displays that it has completed an NFC ssn successfully. We
say τ is successful if O observes a positive confirmation, and
unsuccessful otherwise. We denote C by card(τ) and R by
reader (τ).
Given an NFC tap τ of an actor O and an NFC ssn γ of a
reader R, we say τ and δ coincide when reader (τ) = R and
O perceives the feedback that R displays upon completion of
δ as the reply to his tap τ . We then write τ ≈ δ. Note that
when τ and δ coincide it is a priori not given that R has
indeed communicated with card(τ), even when R confirms a
successful exchange. Given NFC tap or ssn events ǫ1, ǫ2, we
write ǫ1 < ǫ2 when ǫ1 occurs earlier in time than ǫ2.
TAGA Process and Sessions: A concrete TAGA process is
defined by a triple T = (P,N,M), where P is a KE protocol,
N is a NFC system, and M is a set of process measures.
A (TAGA) session of a GU G is a tuple (S, γini , γfin ,K),
where S is the service of G, γini and γfin are successful NFC
ssns of G’s reader such that γini < γfin , and K is a key.
A (TAGA) session of an AC A is a tuple (αmid , S,K, st),
where αmid is a successful NFC ssn of A’s reader, S is a
service, K is a key, and st ∈ {c, u}. st indicates the status of
whether A has already received the finish message (sent via
WLAN for key confirmation) or not: c stands for confirmed,
and u stands for unconfirmed respectively.
A (TAGA) session of an OP O is a tuple (τini , τmid , τfin),
where τini , τmid , and τfin are successful NFC taps of O such
that (1) τini < τmid < τfin , (2) card(τini ) = card(τmid ) =
card(τfin ), (3) reader (τini ) = reader (τfin) is a GU reader,
(4) reader (τmid ) is an AC reader, and (5) there is no other
NFC tap τx of O such that τini < τx < τmid . Moreover, we
assume that the OP’s actions are well-defined as spelled out
in Def. 15.
2) Concept and Security: The original idea behind TAGA
is this: Since TAGA takes place in a secure zone it seems
plausible that by a good choice of NFC system and, perhaps,
additional process measures we can ensure that the TAGA
transport guarantees an authentic message exchange (regarding
both origin and message authenticity). On the one hand, this
means that we can employ an unauthenticated KE protocol
such as the basic DH exchange to securely establish a key,
and TAGA will not depend on any PKI. On the other hand,
this allows for a precise alignment of setting up the secure
channels and the physical connections. More precisely, we
hope to achieve a notion of security for TAGA that not only
asserts the existence of secure keys but also that the NFC ssns
and OP taps coincide in the expected way.
Definition 1. Let T be a TAGA process.
We say T guarantees secure TAGA I to a GU G if, whenever
G has a session (S, γini , γfin ,K) then
1) there is an OP with a session (τini , τmid , τfin) such that
τini ≈ γini , and τfin ≈ γfin ,
2) there is an AC A with a session (αmid , S,K, . . .) such
that τmid ≈αmid , and
3) K is a fresh key known only to G and A.
Similarly, we say T guarantees secure TAGA I to an AC A
if, whenever A has a session (αmid ,K, S, c) then
1) there is an OP with a session (τini , τmid , τfin) such that
τmid ≈αmid ,
2) there is a GU G with a session (S, γini , γfin ,K) such
that τini ≈ γini and τfin ≈ γfin , and
3) K is a fresh key known only to G and A.
We say T guarantees secure TAGA I iff T guarantees secure
TAGA I to both parties, GUs and ACs.
We first confirm that secure TAGA I indeed entails correct
setup when the physical setup is aligned with the TAGA walk.
Definition 2. A process flow F for ground service S is suitable
for secure TAGA I if F guarantees: When a TAGA walk has
been completed between a GU G of type S and an AC A then
G is physically connected to A for S.
Theorem 1. Let F be a process flow for some ground service,
and T be a TAGA process such that F includes T . If F is
suitable for secure TAGA I and T satisfies secure TAGA I
then F guarantees correctness of setup.
To show that secure TAGA I can indeed be obtained as
sketched above we first need to make precise what it means
for the TAGA transport to guarantee an authentic message
exchange. Our notion of channel authenticity asserts that if
there is a GU session then there must be an AC session with
matching messages as well as an operator session whose taps
coincide with the NFC ssns of the GU session, and that of the
AC session respectively. And we require the analogue for the
other direction.
Definition 3. Let N be an NFC system, and M be a set of
process measures.
We say N under M guarantees channel authenticity to a GU
G if, whenever G has a session (S, γini , γfin , . . .) then there is
some OP with a session (τini , τmid , τfin), and some AC with
a session (αmid , ..) such that
1) τini ≈ γini , τmid ≈αmid , and τfin ≈ γfin , and
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2) msg-s(γini ) = msg-r(αmid ), and msg-s(αmid ) =
msg-r(γfin).
Similarly, we say N under M guarantees channel auhenticity
to an AC A if, whenever A has a session (αmid , . . .) then
there is some OP with a session (τini , τmid , . . .), and some
GU with a session (S, γini , . . .) such that
1) τini ≈ γini , and τmid ≈αmid , and
2) msg-s(γini ) = msg-r(αmid ).
We say N under M guarantees channel authenticity iff N
under M guarantees this to both parties, GUs and ACs.
Definition 4. We say a KE protocol P is secure for plain
TAGA when P guarantees secrecy and key freshness in the
presence of passive adversaries.
Theorem 2. A TAGA process T = (P,N,M) guarantees
secure TAGA I if P is secure for plain TAGA, and N under
M guarantees channel authenticity.
3) The Challenge of Channel Authenticity: We now illlus-
trate that it is rather challenging to obtain channel authenticity.
Even though TAGA takes place in a secure zone, where only
authorized personnel have access, the attacker has various
indirect ways of compromising the TAGA transport, and
combining them to MitM or other attacks.
Threats against the TAGA Channel:
Swapping the Card. During a break a GU operator might
reside in a less restricted area. An attacker with pickpocketing
capability could use this as a window of opportunity to swap
a counterfeit card for the TAGA card (carried by the operator
throughout the day). Since pickpocketing can include social
engineering such a card swap cannot be ruled out entirely
even when the card must be worn physically attached to the
operator, e.g. by a lanyard. (A lanyard is a cord or strap worn
around the neck or wrist for security.)
Eavesdropping. Another threat is that the attacker eaves-
drops on the NFC exchange between the card and the GU or
AC reader. While the nominal range of NFC communication is
only 5-10 cm the range of eavesdropping can be considerably
larger. In [1] Finke and Kelter first demonstrate that the
communciation between a ISO-14443 reader and tag can be
eavesdropped from 1-2 meters using a large loop antenna. If a
device is sending in active mode (like the GU and AC reader)
then it can even be eavesdropped on from a distance of up
to 10 m [2]. Moreover, based on simulation Kfir and Wool
predict an eavesdropping distance of tens of meters when an
active antenna is used [3]. At a parking slot, a large antenna
could be hidden in large luggage, sports equipment, prams,
wheelchairs, cages for pets, or instruments. A large antenna
could even be hidden in clothing of an operator such as a
prepped safety vest swapped for the real one in a cafeteria.
Hence, it seems impossible that eavesdropping can be ruled
out by practically enforceable measures in our settting.
Planting a Leech and Skimming. An important component
in relay attacks against electronic payment systems is a leech,
which is a device that fakes a reader to a card. The leech is
smuggled into a victim’s pocket or bag so that it is close to
her payment card. The leech can then power up the tag of the
card, and communicate with it while remaining undetected.
The communication can be relayed by WLAN or cellular
connection via an attacker’s laptop to and from a real payment
terminal. A leech can also be employed as a skimmer to read
out a tag (without writing to it).
The success of a leech depends on whether it is indeed able
to activate the victim’s card. This can be improved by em-
ploying a ‘tuned leech’ with a range beyond the nominal 5-10
cm, e.g. by increasing the power of transmission and/or using
larger antenna. This has been shown to be possible: In [3] Kfir
and Wool predict a distance of 40-50 cm by simulation, and
in [4] Kirschenbaum and Wool have experimentally confirmed
a skimming range of about 25 cm. In our setting, we cannot
rule out that an attacker is able to plant a leech device to skim
or masquerade to the TAGA card: Similarly to card swapping
an attacker could smuggle a leech device into an operators
pocket while he is on a break.
Malware Leech. A particular threat in our setting is that
a standard device with NFC capability carried by authorized
personnel is converted into a leech by malware. For example,
during the TAGA transport the operator might carry a smart-
phone with NFC capability with her. An attacker with standard
hacking capability could compromise the smartphone, e.g. by
planting malware on the device via a Trojan app or a spear
phishing email to the operator. While this allows for purely
remote attacks, in contrast to a hardware leech, the success
of a malware leech is constrained by the standard device’s
nominal range, and the operator being in the habit of storing
it close enough to the card.
Ghost Attacks. The other important component in relay
attacks against electronic payment systems is a ghost, which is
a device that fakes a card to a reader. TAGA seems protected
from ghost attacks by two factors: First, only authorized
personnel can get close to the TAGA readers. Second, TAGA
employs passive cards, and one would expect that for a ghost
to communicate with a GU or AC reader it would have to be
within their nominal activation range. However, in [3] Kfir and
Wool show how to build an active ghost, which considerably
increases the possible distance to the reader. The idea is that
the ghost transmits in a non-standard way using its own power
but so that to the reader the transmission is indistinguishable
from that of a passive tag’s. Based on simulation they predict
a distance of up to 50 m for bi-directional communication. To
our knowledge this has not yet been experimentally confirmed
but it shows that a priori we cannot exclude ghost attacks. A
ghost could either be remote or it could be infiltrated similarly
to a leech device, in which case it can act from a closer
distance.
Attack Examples: We now give examples of how these
attack vectors can be combined to carry out MitM attacks
against a simple NFC system. The first attack shows that the
combination of eavesdropping and card swapping is all the
attacker needs to obtain full MitM capability.
Attack 1 (MitM by Swap & Eavesdrop). Let A be an AC and
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KIA := rARI
Connect to ssidI
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Connect to ssidA
Finish
Receive RG (from Eavesdr.)
KGI := rIRG
Receive RA (from Eavesdr.)
KIA := rIRA
Fig. 5. Attack 1: MitM by Swap & Eavesdrop
G be a GU at parking slot L so that G is to service A. In
preparation, the attacker swaps his own prepped card CI for
the operator’s card as described above. Moreover, the attacker
sets up NFC eavesdropping capability, and his own WLAN
access point API in the range of L. Both CI and API are
prepped with a fixed ephemeral key (rI , RI), and an ssid ssidI
for the attacker’s WLAN.
The attack then proceeds as depicted in Fig. 5. The card CI
carries out the first tap as usual. However, with the second tap
the counterfeit card writes the attacker’s public key RI to A
rather than G’s public key RG. Similarly, with the third tap the
card writes RI and ssid I to G rather than A’s public key RA
and ssid ssidA. Hence, G computes session keyKGI based on
rG and RI , and A computes session key KIA based on rA and
RI . To be able to compute the same keys the attacker needs
to get RG and RA onto his access point API . Since the card
only has a passive NFC interface he relies on eavesdropping to
do so. Once he has computed KGI and KIA he can establish
the corresponding channels and mount a MitM attack.
If the attacker has difficulties in setting up eavesdropping
capability he can skim the keys RA and RG from the card
by a leech device instead. The leech could be planted on the
operator at the same time when the card is swapped, e.g. in a
classical ‘pour drink over shirt’ attack.
The next attack demonstrates that a MitM attack might be
possible purely from remote, without having to break integrity
or authenticity of the card. We assume that the operator is in
the habit of carrying her smartphone with NFC capability in
her pocket, and storing the TAGA card in the same pocket next
to the smartphone while she walks from the GU to the AC,
and similarly for the way back. This is a natural assumption:
the operator typically needs both hands to carry the supply
hose and might not like the dangling of a lanyard.
Attack 2 (MitM with Hacked Smartphone). Let A be an AC
and G be a GU at parking position L so that G is to service
A. In preparation, the attacker hacks the smartphone of the
operator of G, say PI , and sets up his WiFi point API in the
range of L. We assume that the TAGA card is a simple store
NFC card with a register Reg1 assigned for the first message,
and a register Reg2 for the second.
The first NFC tap proceeds as usual, and writes G’s message
into register Reg1 of the card. After the tap the operator
puts the card into her pocket next to her hacked phone
PI . This triggers the NFC module of PI , upon which it
reads the contents of Reg1 (with G’s public key) and then
overwrites them with the attacker’s own key RI . Hence, when
the operator arrives at the AC and performs the (supposedly)
second NFC tap the AC reads the attacker’s key RI . The
second message pass is manipulated in the analogous fashion.
The attacker can easily relay the public keys RG and RA from
the hacked smartphone to his access point API . Now he can
establish the corresponding channels, and act as MitM.
We have implemented this attack against the current proto-
typical implementation of TAGA. It works reliably as long as
the operator observes her habit of storing the TAGA card in the
same pocket next to her phone. If a more complex card than a
simple store card is employed this attack can be prevented
by the card keeping state of the taps, and implementing
input/output checks. However, such measures can be overcome
by a multi-session attack.
Attack 3 (Multi-Session Variation). When the phone PI first
interacts with the card it will now perform three read/writes
instead of one: the first impersonates the AC and reads G’s
public key; the second impersonates the GU during the final
tap and concludes the current session of the card; the third
starts a fresh session, where PI impersonates the GU and
writes the attacker’s key RI . The next tap will be carried out
with the real AC in the appropriate state. The AC has no means
to notice that the attacker has skipped to a new session and
will accept RI as the GU’s key. On the way back the attacker
can proceed in the analogous fashion, and plant successfully
his own key RI for the AC’s key.
Finally, we illustrate that if the attacker manages to install
a ghost then he can very easily stage attacks. In particular,
Imp2AC attacks only require one ‘fake tap’.
Attack 4 (Imp2AC by Ghost). LetDI be a remote or infiltrated
ghost device that can reach the AC reader. Then DI can
establish an NFC link with the AC, and masquerade as a
TAGA card: DI writes the attacker’s key RI to the AC, and
obtains the AC’s key RA in return. The resulting DH session
key allows him to mount an Imp2AC attack against the AC.
4) Designs for the NFC System:
Distribution Model: The swap attack highlights that
authenticity of the card is an important requirement. Hence, it
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is advisable that there is not just a pool of TAGA cards that are
distributed daily to the operators but that a distribution model
is in place that allows for better accountability. The following
two models offer themselves.
In the OP-bound model each GU operator is equipped with
their personal card, which she can use on any GU that she is
authorized to operate. This model is particularly suitable when
airport staff are already provided with multi-functional access
cards, into which TAGA can be integrated as one of several
applications. The card will usually contain a public/private
key pair that is bound to the identity of the operator and a
certificate for the public key signed by the airport.
In the GU-bound model each GU is equipped with its
own TAGA card. The card can be cryptographically bound
to the GU reader so that the GU can only be operated with
its own card, and, conversely, the card will only work with
the GU that owns it. To this end a shared symmetric key
can be pre-installed on both the card and the GU reader in
a secure environment. During operative times the respective
operator is responsible for handling the card while during non-
operative times it is stored within the GU or within a secure
compartment next to the GU reader.
Securing the NFC Links between GU and Card: Both of
the models have the advantage that they come with long-term
cryptographic keys that allow us to add mutual authentication
and to secure the NFC links between the GU and the card.
More precisely, when a new TAGA session is initiated with
the first tap then the GU and card will run an AKE protocol
to mutually authenticate each other and establish a session
key. The session key will be used to secure the data exchange
during the first tap as well as the final tap. In the GU-bound
model authentication can be anchored in the symmetric key
pre-installed on the card and GU reader. In the OP-bound
model this can be based on the public/private key pairs on
the card and likewise on the GU reader and a PKI local to the
airport.
Detection of AC Masquerading: Ensuring that the NFC
exchange between the GU and the card is authenticated has the
advantage that AC masquerading (i.e. attacks where a leech
device masquerades as the AC) can be detected.
A TAGA session of a card C now consists of three steps:
First, C performs an authenticated NFC exchange with a
GU, say G. Second, C carries out an unauthenticated NFC
exchange with, presumably, the AC. Third, C carries out an
authenticated NFC exchange with, and only with, G again.
The implementation will ensure that the card does not accept
any other sequence of exchanges (apart from being reset by
an authenticated GU). Hence, if the operator carries out the
tap with the AC successfully then the second exchange cannot
have resulted from a leech device because there can only be
one successful unauthenticated exchange. If a leech device
masquerades as the AC while the operator walks to the AC
then her tap with the AC will not be successful and she will
abort the TAGA session at the GU.
Securing the NFC Link between Card and AC: Since the
card and AC reader do not share any long-term keys (unless
we break the ‘plain’ paradigm) the NFC exchange between
the card and the AC cannot be secured with regards to origin
authenticity. However, we can still protect the exchange from
data modification as we now explain. Due to its channel char-
acteristics it is generally assumed that NFC is not susceptible
to man-in-the-middle attacks, in particular when run in the
active-passive mode. For example, compare [2] for a precise
argument.
Assumption 1. It is pratically impossible to carry out a man-
in-the-middle attack over NFC in the active-passive mode.
When the card and AC engage in the mid tap then they
can first run an unauthenticated KE protocol such as the basic
DH exchange and establish a session key to secure their data
exchange. While this will a priori not establish that the AC
securely communicates with the card, based on Ass. 1, this will
hold if, in addition, we can ascertain that the card is engaged
in the same NFC link as the AC during the time. The other
direction is analogous.
Distance Bounding: The features discussed so far still
leave open that an attacker carries out remote attacks such
as relay attack to undermine the NFC link between GU and
card, or a ghost attack to masquerade as a card to the AC. This
can be prevented by distance bounding protocols [5], which
guarantee an upper bound on the distance of the card to the
reader. To this end the reader measures the round-trip time of
cryptographic challenge/response pairs it poses to the card. In
our setting, the GU reader must bind this to the authentication
of the card to prevent distance hijacking [6]. Simiarly, the AC
reader must bind this to the ephemeral DH key of the card for
the analogous reason.
Secure Proximate Zone: While distance bounding makes
sure that the AC and GU reader only communicate with a
device close by process measures we can ensure that only a
TAGA card carried by an operator comes closed to the reader.
Together, this will ensure that we obtain the coincidence
between operator taps and NFC ssns of card, AC, and GU
as required for channel authenticity.
Definition 5. Let d be the precision of the distance bound-
ing protocol. M guarantees secure proximate zone, if the
following holds: no NFC device other than a card hold by
an operator who presumes this to be a TAGA card is brought
within distance d of the GU reader, and AC reader respectively.
Altogether, we arrive at a specification of NFC systems for
the GU-bound model, and the OP-bound model respectively.
We denote the first by NGU , and the second by NOP .
Theorem 3. The NFC systems NGU and NOP can be imple-
mented so that under process measures that include ‘secure
proximate zone’ they guarantee channel authenticity.
5) Multi-Instance Resilience and Discussion: To sum up,
we have obtained secure plain TAGA based on the following
insight: While the large secure zone established around an AC
during turnaround leaves the TAGA channel open to many
indirect attacks we can bootstrap channel authenticity from
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binding the card to the GU (either one-to-one or via a PKI local
to the airport), ensuring that the AC and GU readers accept
requests only from a small proximate zone and guaranteeing
that this proximate zone is secure in a strong sense.
Corollary 1. The TAGA processes TGU = (DH , NGU ,M)
and TOP = (DH , NOP ,M) both guarantee secure TAGA I.
Moreover, these TAGA processes come with a strong notion
of multi-instance resilience. Let T be a TAGA process, and
let T1, T2, ..., Tn be n instances of T . Let for each i ∈ [1, n],
Gi be the GU, Ai the AC, and Oi the GU operator respec-
tively. We say the instances T1, . . . , Tn are in parallel if the
respective GUs, ACs, and GU operators are distinct: i.e. for
all i, j ∈ [1, n], Gi = Gj implies i = j, and analogously for
the ACs, and GU operators.
Definition 6. We say a secure TAGA process T guarantees
resilience against parallel scaling of attacks if the effort for the
attacker to successfully attack n parallel instances of T grows
linearly with n wrt a factor of physical effort the attacker
has to spend (e.g. work force, breach of a physical security
measure, compromise of personnel).
Theorem 4. TGU and TAC are resilient against parallel
scaling of attacks (assuming that system integrity of the GU,
AC, and card is resilient in the same way).
On the downside, plain TAGA comes with the caveat that
its security heavily depends on the GU operator. Any security
proof will rest on the premise that the operator observes
procedures such as verifying that the AC has successfully
received the tap, and aborting TAGA at the GU when an
error occurs. Moreover, if a GU operator is compromised
she can always mount a MitM attack in the following way:
While she carries out the GU taps with the authentic card as
usual she performs the AC tap with her own counterfeit card
and uses a leech device to masquerade to the authentic card
as AC reader. The latter can be carried out secretly in her
pocket sometime during the TAGA walk. Of course, the GU
operator is already a trusted party wrt safety of the turnaround.
Nevertheless, from a security viewpoint it seems unorthodox
to make her a trusted third party in the key establishment. For
example, this has disadvantages when it comes to IT forensics
and liability claims. A similar problem arises when ground
units of different providers with different security levels are
to participate in TAGA: Plain TAGA assumes that all ground
units are equally trustworthy.
IV. AUTHENTICATED TAGA
1) Preliminaries: In the setting of authenticated TAGA,
every AC A has a long-term key pair (WA, wA), whereWA is
the public key and wA is the private key. Moreover, A holds
a certificate for its public key WA, which is issued by the
airline A that owns A (or an entity commissioned by A). We
denote the certificate by certA(A,WA, TA, VA), where TA is
the aircraft type of A, and VA specifies the validity period of
the certificate.
Analogously, every GU G has a long-term key pair
(WG, wG), and a certificate for its public key WG, which
is issued by the airport H that harbours G (or an en-
tity commissioned by H). We denote the certificate by
certH(G,WG, SG, VG), where SG is the service type of G
and VG is the validity period of the certificate.
Moreover, we assume that every AC has installed the root
certificates of those airports it intends to land, and each GU has
installed the root certificates of those airlines it is authorized
to handle. Since a GU is specific to its airport, and an AC
knows at which airport it is currently parked (available from its
electronic flight system) we require that when an AC verifies
a GU certificate received during TAGA it will check that the
airport within the certificate agrees with its own location.
Notation 1. For short notation of certificates we often leave
away the issueing party, type of aircraft or service, and/or
validity period when this is implicitly clear from the context.
2) Concept and Security: We say a TAGA process
(P,N,M) is authenticated when P is an authenticated KE
(AKE) protocol. While authenticated TAGA allows us to
establish secure keys without having to rely on channel
authenticity without the latter we cannot expect to reach
Secure TAGA I: We lose the guarantee that the OP taps
and NFC ssns of the GU and AC coincide in the expected
way. However, we can reach another notion of security for
TAGA that, together with a straightforward requirement on
the setup process, allows for a match between cyber channels
and physical connections as required for secure setup.
Secure TAGA II guarantees that when a GU G and an
AC A successfully complete a TAGA session then they are
located at the same parking slot. This can be established by
the underlying AKE protocol in terms of data agreement when
the GU and AC provide their location as input to the protocol.
The requirement on the setup process is that the GU confirms
that its physical setup is complete over the established cyber
channel. The AC can then conclude that it is also physically
connected to its communication partner: G has confirmed it is
ready, and since G is located at the same parking slot as A,
it must indeed be connected to A and not to some other AC.
Definition 7. Let T be a TAGA process.
We say T guarantees Secure TAGA II to a GU G if, whenever
G has a session (S, γini , γfin , A,K) then
1) A has a session (αmid , S,G,K, . . .),
2) K is a fresh key known only to G and A, and
3) A is located at the same parking slot as G.
Similarly, we say T guarantees Secure TAGA II to an AC A
if, whenever A has a session (αmid , S,G,K, c) then
1) G has a session (S, γini , γfin , A,K),
2) K is a fresh key known only to A and G, and
3) G is located at the same parking slot as A.
We say T guarantees Secure TAGA II iff T guarantees Secure
TAGA II to both parties, GUs and ACs.
Definition 8. A process flow F for ground service S is suitable
for secure TAGA II if it guarantees: (1) When a GU of type S
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has completed its physical setup it confirms to the end point
of its cyber channel for S that it is ready. (2) Before an AC
engages into service S it waits until each end point of its nF
cyber channels for S has confirmed that it is ready.
Theorem 5. Let F be a process flow for some service, and T
be a TAGA process such that F includes T . If F is suitable
for secure TAGA II and T satisfies secure TAGA II then F
guarantees correctness of setup.
To implement the requirement of Def. 8 the GU control
needs to “know” when the physical setup is complete. This
can be realized by means of a ‘ready button’ at the GU
to be pressed by the operator on completion of the setup.
Alternatively, a ‘ready signal’ can be triggered when the GU’s
machinery (such as air supply or fuel pump) is activated by
the operator, which is typically the last action of a GU setup.
To reach Secure TAGA II we only need to choose an
AKE protocol that satisfies standard secrecy and authentication
properties, and extend it so that it also guarantees agreement
on service and location. GUs and ACs can communicate their
location explicitly as the number of the parking slot they are
located at. In this case the parking slot needs to be provided
by the GU operator, and pilot respectively, via a user interface.
Alternatively, GUs and ACs can communicate their location
in terms of GPS coordinates. This has the advantage that the
data can be provided automatically by their positioning system.
Due to safety distances that need to be kept between ACs on
the tarmac we expect that this will be sufficiently precise to
verify whether a GU and AC are on the same parking slot.
Definition 9. A KE protocol P is secure for authenticated
TAGA when P satisfies secrecy, key freshness, opposite type,
and agreement on peer, service and location in the presence
of active adversaries. (C.f. App. B)
Theorem 6. Given any N and M , (P,N,M) guarantees
secure TAGA II if P is secure for authenticated TAGA.
Fig. 6 shows TAGA based on the Fully Hashed Menezes-
Qu-Vanstone protocol (FHMQV) [7], [8]. For TAGA we
include service and location into the key confirmation step,
yielding FHMQVCLS . FHMQV is one of the strongest proto-
cols regarding security, resilience and efficiency, and comes
with a security proof.
Corollary 2. Given any N and M , (FHMQVCLS , N,M)
guarantees secure TAGA II.
3) The Challenge of LTKC: Let A be an AC. We say the
attacker has obtained a long-term key compromise (LTKC)
of A if he has managed to get hold of credentials that
authenticateA: A public/private key pair (WA, wA) and a valid
certificate cert(A,WA), which asserts that WA belongs to A.
The definition for a GU G is analogous.
There are many different ways of how an attacker might
obtain a LTKC of a party X . One way is to obtain the
private key of X and use the existing certificate belonging
to X . Another way is that the attacker tricks the certification
GU G OP with MU AC A
Generate (RG, rG)
S,L, cert(G,WG), RG
Walk to AC
S,L, cert(G,WG), RG
Generate (RA, rA)
sA := rA + H(RA, RG, A,G)wA
SG := RG+H(RG, RA, A,G)WG
KS := sASG
K′ := KDF1(KS)
K := KDF2(KS)
macA := macK′ (2, A,G,
RA, RG, S, L, ssidA)
cert(A,WA), RA, ssidA,macA
Walk to GU
cert(A,WA), RA, ssidA,macA
sG := rG + H(RG, RA, A,G)wG
SA := RA+H(RA, RG, A,G)WA
KS := sGSA
K′ := KDF1(KS)
K := KDF2(KS)
macG := macK′ (3, G,A,
RG, RA, S, L, ssidA)
Establish WLAN Channel
macG
Fig. 6. TAGA pairing based on the FHMQVCLS protocol
authority (CA) into issueing a certificate for a key pair he has
generated himself, perhaps for an entity that does not even
exist. This is more indirect but often easier to obtain; e.g.
when the private keys are generated within hardware security
modules and never exported from there. Finally, if the attacker
manages to get hold of the private key of the respective
CA then he can generate as many valid certificates for self-
generated key pairs as he likes. All these cases have been
shown to be possible for real key management applications,
e.g. by exploiting vulnerabilities in the APIs of the employed
hardware security modules [9], [10].
Given a LTKC of an entity X it is clear that the attacker
can impersonate X to other entities. In classical AKE settings
this will only impact on X’s resources or on peers that
communicate specifically with X (based on X’s identity).
However, in our setting of local key establishment, a LTKC
of an AC, say AI , has wider consequences: Given any GU G
that is to service the AC at some parking slot L, the attacker
can impersonate AC (L) to G using the credentials of AI (c.f.
App. E, Fig. 10). Given a LTKC of a GU, say GI , the impact
is locally contained: The attacker can exploit the compromised
certificate of GI only within the realm of GI ’s airport. This
is because the AC will check that the GU certificate is issued
for the airport that it is currently parked at (c.f. Section IV-1).
Say entity X has a LTKC. While, on the level of KE proto-
cols, it cannot be prevented that the attacker can impersonate
X to any other participant, it is important to realize that, in
general, impersonation is not the only attack he can mount
based on the LTKC of X . He might also be able to exploit
the credentials of X to impersonate any other party to X ,
or to mount an attack that violates authentication rather than
secrecy. In the full version we show an example where, based
on a LTKC of a GU GI , the attacker can stage a MitM attack
against any AC serviced by GI . Another example shows how,
given a compromise of any airline’s root key pair, the attacker
can reach a ‘Imp2GU with mismatch diversion attack’ against
any two TAGA instances that happen about the same time at
some airport. Fortunately, advanced AKE protocols such as the
FHMQV are resilient against LTKCs in a way that restores the
expected correspondence between LTKC and impersonation.
Definition 10. Let P be a protocol that is secure for a-TAGA.
P guarantees to an AC A LTKC resilience for a-TAGA if P
guarantees secrecy, key freshness, opposite type and agreement
on peer, service and location to A even when A has a LTKC.
The definition for a GU G is analogous. P is resilient for a-
TAGA when P guarantees this to both parties, ACs and GUs.
Lemma 1. Let P be a protocol that is secure and LTKC re-
silient for a-TAGA. Assume we lift the correctness assumption
that long-term key pairs of ACs and GUs are secure.
1) If a GU has a session (S,A,K) and the attacker knows
K then A must have a LTKC.
2) If an AC has a session (S,G,K, . . .) and the attacker
knows K then G must have a LTKC.
4) Resilience against LTKCs: While advanced AKE proto-
cols tame the effects of LTKCs, on the protocol level, it is not
possible to prevent an attacker from impersonating the entity
with the LTKC to others. Neither is our setting amenable to
fast and trustworthy certificate revocation and certificate status
verification. The reason is twofold: First, this would require
that all airlines and airports mutually trust each other and
apply equivalently strong security management to detect and
report LTKCs. Second, fast verification of the certificate status
would require online connectivity of at least the airport — a
disadvantage compared to the current paper- and human-based
processes. Instead, in our setting of local key establishment we
can harden TAGA against LTKCs by adding physical and local
process measures.
We require that TAGA at least guarantees basic LTKC
resilience: while when an AC A and GU G carry out TAGA
together they must mutually trust each other and the key
management processes of A’s airline and G’s airport they will
never be affected by a security incidence of another airline
or airport. Airport-reliant resilience is stronger in that an
airport and the local AC A do not require to trust the key
management processes of A’s airline at all. This also answers
to the situation when the internal certificate revocation process
of an airline might not reach its aircraft in time. Full resilience
ensures that TAGA has a second line of defense and does not
GU OP with card
· · · certA(A,WA, TA, VA) · · ·
Display
A and TA
Does AC (L) indeed
match A and TA?
If yes press confirm button;
otherwise press stop button
Recv input
If input is ‘confirm’ then proceed
otherwise stop and raise alarm
Fig. 7. Last NFC tap extended by ‘Two Eyes’ verification of AC
rely on long-term credentials as long as the local measures are
not compromised. We now make precise the three notions of
resilience and provide examples of how they can be met.
Definition 11. Let T be a a-TAGA process that guarantees
secure TAGA II. We say T guarantees x LTKC resilience,
where x ∈ {basic, airport-reliant, full} if, whenever an
instance of T is carried out between a GU G and an AC
A at a parking slot L then T guarantees secure TAGA II to
G and A even when,
1) for x = basic, all ACs and GUs other than those in the
domain of A and G have a LTKC.
2) for x = airport-reliant, all ACs and all GUs other than
those in the domain of G have a LTKC.
3) for x = full, all ACs and GUs have a LTKC.
a) Basic LTKC Resilience: To reach basic LTKC re-
silience we only need to ensure that the attacker cannot make
the GU accept a certificate that does not agree with the domain
of the AC actually on site.
Definition 12. A measure M guarantees agreement of AC
domain if, when a GU has a session (S,A,K) at a parking
slot L then A is of the same airline and type as AC (L).
Theorem 7. Let T = (P,N,M) be any TAGA process such
that P is secure and LTKC resilient for a-TAGA and M
guarantees agreement of AC domain. Then T guarantees basic
LTKC resilience.
Agreement of AC domain can be implemented by a simple
measure that makes use of the awareness of the GU operator:
while the GU has no means to verify that the received AC
certificate (and information therein) belongs to the AC present
at the parking slot, clearly, the operator has sight of the AC.
Hence, she is able to verify that visually observable features of
the AC such as its type and airline agree with the information
received by the GU.
Measure 1 (‘Two Eyes’ Verification of AC (2EV)). Assume
the TAGA controller of the GU is equipped with a display
and two input buttons: one to confirm, and the second to stop
the process and raise an alarm. Then the last NFC tap can be
extended by human verification as illustrated in Fig. 7. First,
the operator transfers the second message by NFC tap to the
GU’s controller as usual. Recall that this message contains an
AC certificate certA(A,WA, TA, VA), where A is the airline
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GU G AC A
Generate NG
Pump Encoded NG
Sense Pattern and Decode
Call result Nread
Nread
If Nread = NG then proceed
otherwise stop and raise alarm
Fig. 8. Physical Challenge/Cyber Response (PC/CR)
of A and TA the type of A, supposedly matching AC (L).
Second, the GU shows A and TA on its display, and the GU
operator verifies whether the aircraft AC (L) she sees on the
parking slot is indeed of airline A and type TA. If yes, then she
will confirm the process; otherwise she will stop the process
and raise an alarm.
Unintended errors of the GU operator can be kept small:
they can be trained to keep awareness by injection of false
alarms (similary to security screening at airports). It is also
possible to implement this with dual-control.
Measure 2 (‘Four Eyes’ Verification of AC (4EV)). For
increased security a member of the AC crew can accompany
the GU operator and perform the visual verification as well.
Fact 1. 2EV and 4EV guarantee agreement of AC domain.
b) Airport-reliant LTKC Resilience: Airport-reliant
LTKC resilience will be reached if we make sure that the
GU can detect pure Imp2GU attacks. This is so because by
Lemma 1 another attack will always require a LTKC of the
GU domain.
Definition 13. A measure M guarantees detection against
pure Imp2GU if, whenever a GU G has a session (S,A,K)
at a parking slot L and the attacker knows K then G detects
his and aborts the session (before any safety-critical process
settings are started) as long as AC (L) does not have any
session (S,G′,K ′, c) for some G′ and K ′ such that the
attacker knows K ′.
Theorem 8. Let T = (P,N,M) be any TAGA process such
that P is secure and LTKC resilient for a-TAGA and M guar-
antees detection against pure Imp2GU. Then T guarantees
airport-reliant LTKC resilience.
There are several ways to implement detection against
pure Imp2GU. The following measure translates the standard
scheme of challenge/response authentication into the concept
of physical challenge/cyber response: The GU sends a chal-
lenge via the physical connection, e.g. encoded in a pattern
of pulsating flow, which the AC must answer via the cyber
channel. Thereby the physical connection is directly bound
into the KE process.
Measure 3 (Physical Challenge/Cyber Response (PC/CR)).
Assume that the airpacks of the AC are equipped with mass
airflow sensors that can detect a pattern of airflow changes
and report it to the AC controller. Then a phase of physical
challenge response can be included between the setup phase
and the M2M phase as illustrated in Fig. 8. G generates a
random number of a fixed size, say NG, and encodes this into
a pattern of pulsating airflow. A reads the physical signal by
the airflow sensors and decodes it back into a number, say
Nread . A then responds by sending Nread back to G via the
cyber channel. G checks whether Nread = NG. If this is true
then G concludes that it speaks to AC (L): only the AC that
is physically connected to the GU could have known NG. If
the numbers don’t agree G stops and raises an alarm.
Lemma 2. PC/CR guarantees detection against pure Imp2GU.
The space of nonces must be sufficiently large to reduce the
risk of guessing attacks: Even when the attacker cannot receive
the physical signal he can always guess the nonceNG and send
it back via a cyber channel he has established with the GU by
an impersonation attack. This brings about a trade-off between
security and efficiency. For example: Say the physical channel
allows a binary encoding of numbers in terms of high and low
airflow (e.g. using stuffing to synchronize). Say an encoded
bit requires 2 seconds to be transmitted, and a challenge shall
maximally take 10 (or 20) seconds to be transmitted. Then
one can use a space of 32 (or 1024) nonces, and the attacker
has a 1/32 (or 1/1024) chance to guess correctly.
c) Full LTKC Resilience: Full LTKC resilience can be
reached if the TAGA process guarantees channel authenticity
as a second line of defense without relying on any central key
management. We only neeed to make sure that the underlying
AKE protocol is suitable for this in the following sense:
Definition 14. Let P be a protocol that is secure for a-TAGA.
P guarantees LTKC resilience against local eavesdropping
(eav-LTKC resilience) for a-TAGA if, whenever an instance of
P is run between a GU G and an AC A then, even when both
G and A have a LTKC, P guarantees secrecy, key freshness,
opposite type, and agreement on peer, service and location
to G and A against an attacker that can only eavesdrop on
their current session of P (but actively intervene in all other
sessions as usual).
Corollary 3. Let T = (P,N,M) be a TAGA process such
that P is secure and eav-LTKC resilient for a-TAGA, and N
under M guarantees channel authenticity without relying on
any central key management. Then T guarantees full LTKC
resilience.
Fact 2. NGU under MT guarantees channel authenticity
without relying on any central key management.
5) Resilient Designs:
Theorem 9. For i ∈ [1, 4] let Ti = (FHMQVCLS , Ni,Mi)
where Ni and Mi are as in Table I. For each i ∈ [1, 5], Ti is
secure and guarantees the properties as shown in row i.
For TAGA designs (3) or (4) are most suitable. Our modular
approach makes them amenable to be proved formally within
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N M LTKC R. Multi-Instance R.
1 any 4/2EV basic ?
2 any PC/CR airport-reliant ?
3 NGU MT full yes
4 NGU MT , 4EV full yes
TABLE I
RESILIENT AUTHENTICATED TAGA
a symbolic or cryptographic proof framework [11], [12].
APPENDIX A
RELATED WORK
AKE Protocols and Resilience: Resilience against LTKC
has mainly been studied in the context of foundational re-
search on authenticated DH protocols. The threat of a key
compromise impersonation (KCI) attack where an attacker
impersonates another party to the actor with the LTKC has
been considered early on in [13], and KCI resilience (KCIR)
has been identified as a desirable attribute for AKE protocols
to guarantee [14]. It has also become standard to consider
KCIR and other advanced properties such as forward secrecy
and unknown key-share by state-of-the-art protocol checkers
such as the TAMARIN prover [15].
However, automatic symbolic analysis is still not amenable
to protocols that use multiplication in the DH group and
addition of exponents such as the AKE protocols with implicit
authentication. The MQV [16], and its development to FH-
MQV [7], [8] have arguably the best combination of resilience
properties while in particular the FHMQV also developed for
efficiency. The FHMQV comes with a security proof in a
cryptographic security model [7], [8].
The theory of post-compromise security has been advanced
in [17] and [18]. Following [18] our definition of LTKC
resilience considers all security goals of the protocol. More-
over, we build on the result therein that LTKC resilience of
agreement properties follows from KCIR when the protocol
includes a key confirmation step. Our property eav-LTKC
resilience seems to be new. It is close to the well-known
property of forward secrecy (e.g. [14]. Although for practical
protocols the two properties will typically coincide, in general,
they seem incomparable: it seems possible to construct an
artificial protocol for which the two notions will differ.
NFC Related Attacks and Distance Bounding: We have
already discussed in Section III-3 how research has shown
that the nominal guarantees of NFC can be overcome by an
attacker. Distance bounding protocols have been introduced
to verify the physical proximity or location of a device [19],
[5], [20]. While there are now many designs out there and
the EMV Contactless Specifications for Payment Systems
(Version 2.6, 2016) has included relay resistance protocols
new attacks against them have also been devised (e.g. [6],
[21]). To counter this the formal verification community has
also provided techniques to verify such protocols [6]. While
this work has focused on the protocols themselves our work
considers how their guarantees can be used in a overall security
concept that employs them.
APPENDIX B
KEY ESTABLISMENT PROTOCOLS
Diffie-Hellman Protocols: (Authenticated) Diffie-
Hellman (DH) protocols assume a cyclic group G of prime
order n, and a generator P of G such that the decisional
Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in G. The domain parameters
G,n, and P can be fixed or sent as part of the first message.
We use small letters to denote elements of the field Z∗n, and
capital letters for elements of G. A key pair in the protocols
consists of a public key T , which is a group element, and a
private key t, which is an element of the field Z∗n such that
T = tP . Given an entity X , we denote their ephemeral key
pair by (RX , rX), and their long-term key pair by (WX , wX)
respectively. Group operations are written additively (A+B,
or cA) consistent with notation for elliptic curve cryptography.
Let H be a l-bit hash function, where l = (log2 n)/2.
Moreover, let KDF1 and KDF 2 be key derivation func-
tions, mac be a message authentication code, and sign a
signature scheme. We write m1||m2 for the concatenation of
two messages m1 and m2.
Security Properties: (captured as injective agreement
between the runs of the two parties [22]),
We say a KE protocol guarantees to an AC A
. . .Secrecy if, whenever A completes a run of the protocol,
apparently with GU G, then no party other than A and G can
compute the session key.
. . .Key Freshness if, whenever A completes a run of the
protocol, and computes K as the session key, then there is at
most one other run of the protocol in which K is the resulting
session key.
. . .Opposite Type if, whenever A completes a run of the
protocol, apparently with GU G, then G is indeed a GU.
. . .Agreement on Peer if, whenever A completes a run of the
protocol, apparently with GU G, and computes K as the
session key, then G has a unique run in which K is the
resulting session key, and in this run A is the apparent peer.
. . .Agreement on Service if, wheneverA completes a run of the
protocol, apparently with GU G and for carrying out service
S, and computes K as the session key, then G has a unique
run in which K is the resulting session key, and in this run S
is the apparent service to be carried out.
Agreement on Location if, whenever A completes a run of
the protocol, apparently with GU G, then G is at the same
location as A.
The guarantees to GU G are defined analogously. We say a
protocol guarantees security propertyX when it guarantees X
to both parties, ACs and GUs.
APPENDIX C
GROUND PROCESSES: FUELLING
Fuelling: Fig. 9 shows a process for fuelling in a setting
where the fuel is obtained from an underground pipeline via a
fuel truck. The fueller’s first step is to connect the input fuel
hose of the truck to a hydrant in the ground. Moreover, the
fueller needs to connect the output fuel hose of the truck to
the fuelling port of the AC. The fuelling ports are typically
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Signal ready
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physical setup
Fig. 9. Process flow for fuelling
positioned under the wings of the plane, and this step often
involves that the fueller uses a lift integrated in the truck to
take him up with the hose to one of the wings. In addition,
safety measures are carried out: before the AC is hooked up
to the fuel hose a ground wire is laid from the fuel truck
to the AC, and before the fuelling starts the fuel is checked
for contamination. TAGA pairing is integrated as follows: The
first and second NFC taps are aligned with connecting up the
ground wire, and the third tap is carried out after the fuel hose
is connected up. Finally, the fueller activates the fuel pump. At
the AC, the pilot (or automatic control) waits until the secure
channel is established and he has the okay from the fueller
(or the fuel truck via the secure channel) that the fuel hose is
connected up.
At the AC, the first action of the M2M phase is that the
pilot (or automatic control) opens up the valves of the tanks,
and activates the automatic fuel system. The M2M process
makes use of the fact that most ACs already have an automated
fuelling system: given a specified amount of fuel, the fuelling
system distributes incoming fuel automatically into the various
sections of the tank, monitors the amount of fuel already
received, and automatically shuts the valves of the tank when
the specified amount has been reached. As usual backflow will
stop the fuel pump of the truck. During the M2M phase the
AC can communicate several fuel orders to the fuel truck so
that the fuel can automatically and precisely be topped up
according to an increase in the weight of the plane. When the
final weight is known and the final fuel amount reached the
AC notifies the fuel truck that the service is complete. After an
analogous reply by the truck the service enters the disconnect
phase. In the latter the communication session is closed and
the physical setup is reversed.
Fuelling with Two Trucks: Large ACs such as the A380
usually employ two fuel trucks to fuel from the left and right
wing in parallel. Then two parallel sessions of the above
process must be run. The following synchronization point
between the two fuelling sessions is required: the pilot (or
automatic control) only opens the valves of the tank system
after two secure channels are established and both fuellers (or
fuel trucks) have confirmed that the physical connection of the
fuel hose on their side is ready.
APPENDIX D
RELATING TO SECTION III
Definition 15. We assume that each reader displays the status
of the tap it received (i.e. initial, mid, final), and that the
operator’s actions are well-defined in the following sense:
1) The operator taps an AC only as part of the mid tap of
a TAGA session.
2) If during a TAGA walk the operator observes that the
display of the GU or AC reader does not confirm
the action she expected to carry out (e.g. the tap is
(repeatedly) unsuccessful or the GU reader returns ‘first
tap’ while the operator expected this to be the final tap)
then she will reset the TAGA controller at the GU before
carrying out any further taps.
Proof of Theorem 1. This is straightforward from the defini-
tions.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Channel Authenticity to G, there is
some OP with a session (τini , τmid , τfin) and some AC with a
partial session (αmid , S
′,K ′, u) such that τini = γini , τmid =
αmid , and τfin = γfin , and msg(γini ) = msg-r(αmid ) and
msg-s(αmid ) = msg(γfin). Hence, S = S
′, and G and A
will compute K , and K ′ respectively, based on the same DH
public keys. Hence, we also have K = K ′, K is fresh and
only known to A and G.
By Channel Authenticity to A, there is some OP with a
partial session (τini , τmid , . . .) and some GU G has a partial
session (γini , . . .) such that τini = γini , τmid = αmid , and
msg(γini ) = msg-r(αmid). Since A has obtained the Finish
message someone other than A knows the key K . By secrecy
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under passive adversaries only G can know the key. Hence, G
has sent the Finish message and must have a complete session
(x, y, z,K). By freshness G does not use the same key twice,
and hence x = S, and y = τini . By Authenticity to G there
must be a TAGA walk (τini , τ
′
mid , τ
′
fin ) such that z = τfin .
Then clearly also τmid = τ
′
mid . Hence, matching OP session
also exists.
Proof of Theorem 3: Theorem 3 follows from Lemma 3
and Lemma 4 below. The first proves that when a NFC system
guarantees certain properties to be defined below then under
the measure ‘secure proximate zone’ it will guarantee channel
authenticity. The second lemma then argues that NGU and
NOP satisfy these properties. Before proving the lemmas we
need more definitions and intermediary facts.
More definitions: If a reader R has a NFC ssn δx , and
a card C has a NFC ssn γy , and R and C communicate
with each other during these NFC ssns then we write this
by δx↔γy .
A (TAGA) session of a card C is a tuple (σini , σmid , σfin)
where σini , σmid , σfin are successful NFC ssns of C such that
(1) σini < σmid < σfin , and (2) msg-r(σini ) = msg-s(σmid ),
and msg-r(σmid ) = msg-s(σfin ).
Between OP taps and reader NFC ssns and sessions:
Due to ‘secure proximate zone’ and distance bounding we can
infer operator taps from NFC ssns of the GU and AC reader,
and vice versa:
Proposition 1. Let N be a NFC system with distance bound-
ing, and assume ‘secure proximate zone’ holds.
1) If a GU or AC reader R has a NFC ssn δx and
partner(δx ) is proximate during δx then there is an
operator tap τx such that
a) card(τx ) = partner(δx ), and
b) τx ≈ δx .
2) If there is an operator tap τx and reader(τx ) is a GU
or AC reader R then R has a NFC ssn δx such that
a) card(τx ) = partner(δx ), and
b) τx ≈ δx .
c) If R is a GU reader then C is authentic.
Proof. (1) This follows from ‘secure proximate zone’.
(2) Since the operator visually verifies that the reader has
successfully completed an NFC exchange (e.g. green light)
δx exists. By distance bounding and ‘secure proximate zone’
the exchange must have indeed been carried out with the
operator’s card. If the reader is a GU the GU will check
authenticity of the card during the exchange, and the NFC
exchange will fail if it is not (e.g. red light).
Proposition 2 (Taps and reader sessions). 1) If there are
operator taps τx and τy and a GU session
(S, γini , γfin , . . .) such that τx ≈ γini and τy ≈ γfin then
there must be an operator session (τx , τmid , τy ) for some
τmid .
2) If there is an operator tap τac and an AC session
(αmid , . . .) such that τac ≈αmid then there must be an
operator session (τini , τac , . . .) for some τini .
Proof. (1) By Def. 15(2) the operator will immediately abort
the GU session if τx wasn’t the first tap of a TAGA session
(τx , . . .). Since G receives the last NFC ssn the latter must be
true. By definition of TAGA session of OP, clause (5), the next
tap the operator will carry out is with the AC. By Def. 15(2)
the tap is either successful or the operator will immediately
abortG’s session. SinceG receives the last NFC ssn the former
must be true. But then τmid exists as required.
(2) This follows from Def. 15(1) .
Guarantees of the NFC System: The following are guar-
antees that the NFC system must provide to the GU, card, and
AC.
Definition 16 (Guarantees to GU). Let N be a NFC system.
We say N guarantees ‘authenticity of initial tap to a GU G’
if, whenever G has a session (S, γini , . . .) then there is an
authentic card C with a session (σini , . . .) such that
1) γini↔σini and msg(γini ) = msg(σini ), and
2) C is proximate to G during σini .
We say N guarantees ‘authenticity of final tap to a GU G’ if,
whenever G has a session (S, γini , γfin , . . .) then there is an
authentic card C with a session (σini , σmid , σfin) such that
1) γini↔σini and msg(γini ) = msg(σini ),
2) γfin↔σfin and msg(γfin ) = msg(σfin ), and
3) C is proximate to G during σini and σfin .
Definition 17 (Guarantees to Card). Let N be a NFC system.
We say N guarantees ‘authenticity of initial tap to a card C’
if, whenever C has a session (σini , . . .) then there is some GU
G with a session (S, γini , . . .) such hat
1) γini↔σini , and msg(γini ) = msg(σini ), and
2) C is proximate to G during σini .
We say N guarantees ‘authenticity of mid tap with AC to
a card C if, whenever C has a session (σini , σmid , . . .) and
partner(σmid ) is an AC A then A has a session (αmid , . . .)
such that αmid↔σmid and msg(αmid ) = msg(σmid ).
Definition 18 (Guarantees to AC). Let N be an NFC system.
We say N guarantees ‘proximity of NFC peer to an AC
A’ if, whenever an AC A has a session (αmid , . . .) then
partner(αmid ) is proximate to A during αmid .
We say N guarantees ‘authenticity of mid tap with an au-
thentic card to an AC A’, if whenever A has a session
(αmid , . . .) and partner(αmid ) is an authentic card C then
C has a session (σini , σmid , . . .) such that αmid↔σmid and
msg(αmid ) = msg(σmid ).
Lemma 3. Let N be an NFC system, and M a set of process
measures such that N implements distance bounding and the
guarantees to GU, card, and AC of Def. 16, 17, 18, and
M guarantees ‘secure proximate zone’. Then N under M
guarantees Channel Authenticity.
Proof. Guarantee for GU: Assume G has a session
(S, γini , γfin , . . .). Then by ‘authenticity of final tap to G’
there is an authentic card C with a session (σini , σmid , σfin )
such that the NFC ssns and exchanged messages are matching,
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i.e.: γini↔σini , γfin↔σfin , msg(γini ) = msg(σini ), and
msg(γfin ) = msg(σfin ). Moreover, C is proximate to G
during σini and σfin .
By Prop. 1(1) there are successful operator taps τini , τfin
such that card(τini ) = C and τini ≈ γini , and card(τfin ) = C
and τfin ≈ γfin respectively. Then by Prop. 2(1) there is an
operator with a session (τini , τmid , τfin) for some τmid .
Further, by definition of OP session we obtain
reader (τmid ) = A for some AC A and card(τmid ) = C.
Hence, by Prop 1(2) A has a successful NFC ssn αac
such that partner(αac) = C and τmid ≈αac . Let σac
be defined by αac↔σac . σac takes place after γini (and
hence σini ) and before γfin (and hence σfin ). Hence, we
conclude that σac = σmid . Then by ‘authenticity of mid
tap with AC to C’ A must have a session (αmid , . . .) and
msg(αmid ) = msg(σmid ). Finally, by definition of session of
a card it is straightforward to check that the messages of the
A session match those of the G session.
Guarantee for AC: Assume A has a session (αmid , . . .).
Then by ‘proximity of NFC peer to A’ partner(αmid ), say C,
is proximate. Then by Prop. 1(1) there is a successful operator
tap τac such that τac ≈αmid and card(τac) = C. Then by
Prop. 2(2) there is an operator with session (τ iniac , τac , . . .) for
some τ iniac . By definition of OP session reader (τ
ini
ac ) is a GU
Gac , and card(τ
ini
ac ) = C.
By Prop. 1(2) Gac has a successful NFC ssn γ
ini
ac such that
partner(γiniac ) = C, τ
ini
ac ≈ γ
ini
ac , and C is authentic. Let σ
ini
ac
be defined by γiniac ↔σ
ini
ac .
Since C is authentic by ‘authenticity of mid tap with
authentic card to A’ C has a session (σini , σmid , . . .) such that
αmid↔σmid and msg(αmid ) = msg(σmid ). By ‘authenticity
of first tap to C’ there is some GU G with a session
(S, γini , . . .) such that γini↔σini , msg(γini) = msg(σini ),
and C is proximate to G during σini . By definition of session
of a card we also obtain that the messages of αmid and γini
are matching.
Moreover, by Prop. 1(1) there is a successful operator tap
τini such that card(τini ) = C and τini ≈ γini . Hence, it only
remains to show that τini = τ
ini
ac . To the contrary assume
this not to be the case. Then by definition of OP session,
clause (5) τini < τ
ini
ac , and hence σini < σ
ini
ac . But this leads
to a contradication: since τac ≈σmid and σini immediately
precedes σmid on C, we must have σ
ini
ac < σini .
Lemma 4. NGU and NOP implement distance bounding and
meet the guarantees of Def. 16, 17, 18.
Proof. We only provide the argument for NGU . The proof
for NOP is analogous just based on an argument based in
public key authentication instead. Distance bounding is given
as explained in Section III-4.
Guarantees to GU: At the first tap the GU reader runs an
AKE protocol based on KGC shared between the GU and
the authentic card. Moreover, it will run a distance bounding
protocol to ensure that the co-owner of KGC is close by. The
communication is secured by the established session key, say
K . At the third tap the GU reader runs an AKE protocol based
on K , including distance bounding to ensure the co-owner of
K is close by. This binds the third tap to the first as required.
Guarantees to card: At the initial tap the card runs an
AKE protocol based on KGC shared only with the GU.
Since the GU will only communicate with a card when it
can successfully prove its proximity, the card knows that if it
has a successful first NFC ssn then it communicates with a
proximate GU. Again the communication itself is secured by
the established session key.
The mid tap will be protected by a key established via the
basic DH exchange. Hence, if the mid tap is indeed carried
out with an authentic AC then by Ass. 1 the communication
is secured and the messages are matching.
Guarantees to AC: ‘Proximity’: This is guaranteed by the
distance bounding protocol, and because the communication
is secured by DH such that the owner of the DH public key
is proximate. Authenticity when the tap is carried out with an
authentic card follows because the communication is secured,
and the card only accepts unauthenticated communication as
part of its mid tap.
Proofs of Section III-5:
Proof of Theorem 4. To undermine a TAGA instance an at-
tacker has to compromise channel authenticity. To this end
the attacker either needs to undermine authenticity of the card,
compromise the local GU operator, or infiltrate in person the
secure zone during turnaround. For N-OP: Even if the attacker
obtains a public/private key pair and can prepare a counterfeit
card, they will still need to swap it with the operators card. For
N-GU: Even if they obtain a master key (and update ability)
they still need to swap the card within the GU.
APPENDIX E
RELATING TO SECTION IV
Proof of Theorem 5. This is straightforward to check.
Proof of Theorem 6. This is straightforward from the defini-
tions.
Proof of Theorem 7. Assume a TAGA process between GL
and AL at L.
If GL has a session (S,A,K) then by key confirmation
someone knows the key. This must be an honest party or the
attacker. If the attacker does not know K then agreement is
guaranteed, and hence, A has a matching session at the same
location as required. If the attacker knowsK then by Lemma 1
A must have a LTKC. By ‘agreement of AC domain’ A must
be of the same airline and type as AL.
If AL has a session (S,G,K, c) then by key confirmation
someone knows the key. The first case is as above. If the
attacker knows K then by Lemma 1 G must have a LTKC.
By certificate verification G is a GU of the local airport.
Proof of Theorem 8. Assume a TAGA process between GL
and AL at L.
If GL has a session (S,A,K) and the attacker knows K
then the attack will be detected and the session aborted, or
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GU G OP with UI AC A
API
Generate (RG, rG)
S,L, cert(G,WG), RG
Walk to AC
S,L, cert(G,WG), RG
Compute as usual
Algorithm ICrypt(G,WG, RG):
sI := rI + H(RI , RG, AI , G)wI
SG := RG + H(RG, RI , AI , G)WG
KS := sISG
K′ := KDF1(KS); K := KDF2(KS)
macI := macK′(2, AI , G,RI , RG, S, L, ssidI)
On card UI :
Ignore A’s response
Compute AI ’s “response”
To obtain macI do
ICrypt(G,WG, RG)
Receive WG , RG
(from Eavesdropper)
To obtain K do:
ICrypt(G,WG, RG)
Ea
ve
sd
ro
p
cert(AI ,WI ), RI , ssidI ,macI
Walk to GU
cert(A,WA), RA, ssidA,macA
sG := rG +H(RG, RI , AI , G)wG
SI := RI + H(RI , RG, AI , G)WI
KS := sGSI
K′ := KDF1(KS)
K := KDF2(KS)
macG := macK′(3, G,AI ,
RG, RI , S, L, ssidI)
Establish WLAN Channel
macG
Fig. 10. Impersonation to GU with LTKC of any AC
AL has a TAGA session (S,G
′,K ′, ?) for some G′, K ′ such
that the attacker knows K ′. In the latter case by Lemma 1
G′ must have a LTKC. By certificate verification G′ is a GU
of the local airport. If the attacker does not know K then the
usual argument applies.
If AL has a TAGA session (S,G,K, c) and the attacker
knows K then by Lemma 1 G must have a LTKC. By
certificate verificationG is a GU of the local airport. Otherwise
the usual argument applies.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let G be a GU with a session (S,A,K)
at parking slot L, and assume G has sent the challenge. Say
G obtains the correct answer. We must show that the attacker
does not know K unless AC (L) has a compromised session
on S.
Let AL = AC (L). Only AL could have known the nonce,
and sent it on. Hence, AL has a session (S,G
′,K ′, c) for
some G′, K ′ during which it has responded to the challenge.
If the attacker knows K ′ then nothing has to be proved. If
the attacker does not know K ′ then AL has the session with
an honest party, who would not forward AL’s reply to G.
Hence K = K ′. And hence, the attacker does not know K as
required.
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